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ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
The District Court Erred In Reversing the Magistrate Court's Order Denying 
Thiel's Motion For Release From Jail 
A. Introduction 
The district court erred when it reversed the magistrate court's order 
denying Corey Thiel's motion for immediate release from custody. Specifically, 
the district court erred by concluding that I.C. § 20-621 gives county sheriffs the 
authority to direct magistrate courts to release inmates. 
B. Idaho Code § 20-621 Does Not Require A Magistrate Court To Grant A 
County Sheriff's Inmate Release Request 
Idaho Code§ 20-621 reads: 
Every person serving a jail sentence in a county jail in the 
state of Idaho who has a good record as a prisoner and who 
performs the tasks assigned him in an orderly and peaceable 
manner, shall upon the recommendation of the sheriff be allowed 
five (5) days off of each and every month of his sentence, by the 
magistrate judge. 
As the state has previously argued, (Appellant's brief, pp.6-10), I.C. § 20-
621 is ambiguous because it does not describe the respective roles and duties of 
the county sheriff and magistrate court in the good-time early inmate release 
process. However, application of the tools of statutory construction and a 
consideration of public policy reveal that the statute permits a county sheriff to 
recommend the release of jail inmates, and permits the magistrate court to 
exercise its discretion to consider whether or not the statute's requirements have 
been satisfied. The statute does not permit a county sheriff to direct magistrate 
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courts to release inmates in the absence of judicial review and input and 
argument from the state and from crime victims. 
In response to the state's argument, Thiel relies heavily on the statute's 
inclusion of the term "shall." (Respondent's brief, pp.5-7.) Thiel asserts this 
term precludes any judicial review or use of discretion in the good-time early 
inmate release process. (Id.) However, in I.C. § 20-621, the term "shall" does 
not so clearly limit the court's authority. Rather than expressly and 
unambiguously directing a magistrate court to release inmates in any particular 
circumstance, the statute only indicates that an inmate "shall. .. be allowed" 
release, if the requirements of the statute are met. Rather than impose any 
mandatory duty on the magistrate court, the statute merely defines the 
parameters of when an inmate is eligible for (i.e., "allowed") early release, and 
provides the county sheriff the authority to "recommend" release in these 
circumstances. 1 See,~ City of Wheat Ridge v. Cerveny, 913 P.2d 1110, 
1113-1115 (Colo. 1996) (interpreting a state constitutional provision that 
"successful plaintiffs are allowed costs and reasonable attorney fees," as merely 
permitting, rather than mandating, a court's issuing of costs and reasonable 
attorney fees to a successful plaintiff). 
1 Additionally, as discussed below, if the term "shall" in I.C. § 20-621 precludes 
judicial review of a county sheriff's inmate release "recommendation," then this 
portion of the statute is unconstitutional. This Court may strike this portion of 
I.C. § 20-621 without striking the entire statute. State v. Nielsen, 131 Idaho 494, 
497, 960 P.2d 177, 180 (1998) ("When part of a statute or ordinance is 
unconstitutional and yet is not an integral or indispensable part of the measure, 
the invalid portion may be stricken without affecting the remainder of the statute 
or ordinance."). 
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Further, the very fact that the "magistrate judge" is referenced in I.C. § 20-
621 indicates that the magistrate court has some non-ministerial role in the I.C. § 
20-621 good-time early inmate release process. If the legislature intended to 
grant county sheriffs the unreviewable authority to release inmates, it would have 
omitted the magistrate judge from the statute altogether and expressly permitted 
county sheriffs to release qualifying inmates themselves; or, at least, it would 
have expressly limited the magistrate court's role in the process as one entirely 
subject to the direction of the county sheriff. 
Application of the tools of statutory construction, and a consideration of 
the relevant public policy considerations, reveals that the legislature did not 
intend to provide county sheriffs unbridled authority to direct magistrate courts to 
release inmates. Therefore, the district court erred in reversing the magistrate 
court's order denying Thiel's motion for release from custody. 
C. In The Alternative, To The Extent I.C. § 20-621 Provides County Sheriffs 
The Authority To Direct Magistrate Courts To Release Inmates, The 
Statute Violates The Idaho Constitution 
The Idaho Constitution prohibits the legislature from "depriv[ing] the 
judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a 
coordinate department of the government." Idaho Const. Art. V, § 13; see also 
Idaho Const. Art. II, § 1 (providing that no branch of government may exercise 
power properly belonging to either of the others, except as expressly directed or 
permitted by the constitution); State v. Finch, 79 Idaho 275, 281, 315 P.2d 529, 
531 (1957) Uudicial power vested in the courts cannot be conferred upon any 
agency of the executive department in the absence of constitutional authority). 
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The Idaho Supreme Court has described such "rightly pertain[ed]" 
powers as those inherently held by the judiciary, as identified in the common law, 
and as described by the Idaho Constitution. See State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 
240, 386 P.2d 247, 251 (1971 ); Idaho Const. Article V. Thus, the relevant issue 
as to the constitutionality of I.C. § 20-621 in this case is whether a county 
sheriff's ability to direct magistrate courts to release inmates infringes upon a 
power "rightly pertain[ing]" to the judiciary, and whether some Idaho 
constitutional provision expressly permits the legislature to divest this power. 
On appeal, Thiel notes that there are "several instances" in which the 
Idaho appellate courts have held that the legislative or executive branch may 
divest "discretion out of the hands of the sentencing judge," including mandatory 
minimum sentences, and the Idaho Commission of Pardon and Parole's 
commutations of sentences. (Respondent's brief, pp.4-5 (citations omitted)). 
However, in both of these instances, the relevant powers were expressly 
granted to the legislature by the Idaho Constitution. Article V, § 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution specifically permits the legislature to "provide mandatory minimum 
sentences for any crimes." Article IV, § 7 gave the legislature the authority to 
create the board of pardons, and to grant that board the power to commute and 
pardon convicted defendants. Article IV, § 7 also provides that "no 
commutation" of sentences may be granted except as provided for in that 
section. See also Bates v. Murphy, 118 Idaho 239, 242, 796 P.2d 116, 119 
(1990) (holding that several Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole sentence 
discharges were void because they constituted "commutations" and did not 
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comply with the procedures set forth in Article IV, Sec. 7). Thiel has identified no 
Idaho Constitutional provision that permits the legislature to grant county sheriffs 
the authority to commute sentences and release inmates upon the sheriff's own 
unreviewable determination of the satisfaction of certain requirements. 
Instead, to the extent I.C. § 20-621 provides county sheriffs the authority 
to direct magistrate courts to release inmates, the statute impermissibly divests 
power "rightly pertain[ing]" to the judicial department; specifically, the powers to 
sentence offenders, to suspend sentences (and implicitly to re-impose 
suspended sentences after a probation violation), and to compel obedience to 
lawful orders. (See Appellant's brief, p.11 (citing Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 
227, 232, 392 P.2d 279 281 (1964) (recognizing inherent judicial power to control 
and prevent abuse of court orders); McCoy, 94 Idaho at 239-240, 486 P.2d at 
250-251 (recognizing inherent judicial power to exercise discretion in sentencing, 
and to suspend sentences); State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 302-303, 322 P.2d 
296 (2014) (recognizing inherent judicial power to determine sentence).) 
Next, Thiel contends that, even to the extent Idaho Constitution-created 
district courts have the inherent authority described above, I.C. § 20-621 
pertains, by its own language, only to magistrate courts. (Appellant's brief, pp.3-
5.) Thiel asserts that because magistrate courts were created by the legislature, 
and because the legislature is constitutionally empowered to determine the 
jurisdiction of magistrate courts, "there is no separation of powers issue" with 
regard to magistrate courts. (Id.) 
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Theil's argument fails because the Idaho Constitution prohibits the 
legislature from divesting power from the "judicial department," not merely from 
constitutionally-created courts. Idaho Const. Art. II, § 1; Art. V, § 13. The 
magistrate courts are a division of district court, and thus part of the Idaho judicial 
"department." See St. Benedict's Hosp. v. Twin Falls County, 107 Idaho 143, 
146, 686 P.2d 88, 91 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing I.C. §§ 1-2208, 2210; I.R.C.P. 
82(c)(1 ), 82(c)(2)) (disapproved of on other grounds by University of Utah Hosp. 
on Behalf of Scarberry v. Board of County Com'rs, 116 Idaho 434, 438-439, 776 
P.2d 443, 447-448 (Idaho 1989)); see also Idaho Const. Art. V, § 2 (expressly 
identifying legislative-created courts as part of the "judicial power of the state"). 
The magistrate court division thus has the same inherent authority and same 
protections against intrusion from other branches that the district court does, 
subject only to express constitutional limitations, such as the legislative branch's 
constitutionally-derived authority to define the magistrate court's jurisdiction. 
Idaho Const. Art. V, § 2 
The magistrate court division is part of the "judicial department" of Idaho. 
The legislature may not infringe upon the powers that "rightly pertain" to the 
judicial department, including the magistrate court. Among these powers are 
those to sentence, to suspend sentences, and to control and prevent abuse of 
court orders. The legislature may not divest these powers from the judicial 
department absent express constitutional authority to do so. Idaho Code § 20-
621, as interpreted by Thiel, violates the Idaho Constitution because it divests the 
magistrate courts' inherent sentencing authority by granting county sheriffs the 
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power to direct magistrate courts to release inmates, and to essentially modify 
valid judgments of conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to vacate the district court's 
appellate decision, reinstate the magistrate court's order denying Thiel's motion 
to release from custody, and to remand for further proceedings. 
DATED this 4th day of August 2014 
MARK W. OLSON \ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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